Under the new electoral laws, the party would have to expel Suu Kyi if it wanted to participate because she is serving a prison term. Additionally, failure to register for the elections would result in automatic dissolution, bringing about the end of the NLD. Despite this possibility, Suu Kyi has expressed her support towards her party’s decision.

While Myanmar has always escaped formal censure from the grouping in the past due to their non-interference policy, some ASEAN members have separately criticised Myanmar’s military regime and called for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release.

Sources:
ASEAN MPs Tell Leaders to Consider Expelling Myanmar [AFP, 7 Apr 2010]
ASEAN to Question Myanmar over Election Laws [Reuters, 7 Apr 2010]

Photographs and images used on this website are obtained from publicly-accessible resources. No copyright infringement is intended.

(See also APEC CEO Summit 2009 Session 10: Are our present models of regionalism such as APEC and ASEAN adequate?, a dialogue with HE Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia, HE President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa of Mexico and HE Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of Thailand)

This short paper is presented for the “track one and a half” consultation on “the Asia Pacific Community in the 21st century”, convened by the Australian government.  The paper briefly discusses three questions: (1) What is the APc proposal? (2)  What are the implications of the proposal(s)? ; and (3) What principles should guide the path ahead for the region?

What is the APc Proposal?
From very early since assuming his office, the Australian PM Kevin Rudd has mentioned the proposal for a new process or institution to be known as the Asia Pacific community (APc). Nevertheless, there remains considerable doubt about what an APc might look like, as conceived by PM Rudd and Australia. Moreover, what has been said about the APc proposal by PM Rudd has seemed to change over time, and the idea may still evolve further.

This is, in part no doubt, due to the stated policy of PM Rudd and his Special Envoy, Ambassador Richard Woolcott, to consult and be in a listening mode on the proposal. The relatively long time line PM Rudd has now proposed for the APc to coalesce (2020) is another reason for this lack of details.

However, from different sources and especially the most recent statement by PM Rudd (Source: Rudd, APEC CEO Summit, 15 Nov 2009), we can glean the following elements of the APc:

1. The APc should be a single institution to meet at the leaders’ level with a mandate to address comprehensively both economic and strategic (including security and political) challenges.
2. The APc would build on existing regional architecture but as yet, none of the existing structures/fora is satisfactory.
3. The APc would foster habits of cooperation and mutual assistance and thus avoid the risk of negative competition and conflict.
4. The membership should be “the economies and countries of our region”. These would include the USA, China, Japan, India, Australia and those from Southeast Asia.

Todate, there has not been a very strong reaction to the proposal, whether positive or negative. But the lack of a strong reaction is not to suggest support or acceptance. In considerable part, this has been because PM Rudd and the Australian government have not endorsed specifics of the APc proposal. Even so, in April 2009, at a relatively early stage of the discussion, a gathering of ASEAN think tanks and experts concluded that, “ASEAN should not formulate a position on the Australian proposal for an Asia Pacific Community until the purposes and modalities for the new grouping are further clarified, including the potential overlaps with existing processes in Asia and the Asia-Pacific.” The meeting also warned that, “There are dangers if we undermine the existing processes, especially when it is not clear if this idea would be able to succeed where the existing processes already face challenges.” (source: ASEAN-ISIS and Think Tank Meeting, 16 April)

An idea initiated by one may however be taken up by others for different reasons and with different details. Whether intended or not, the discussion initiated by PM Rudd has thrown up the following possibilities:

1. Asian G8: An Asian G8 comprising US, China, Japan, Russia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Australia; (source: Paul Kelly, Shape of the Future, The Australian 20 Dec 08, quoting Richard Woolcott)
2. Asian G10: An Asian G10 comprising the above countries plus the present and future ASEAN Chairs; (source: Paul Kelly, Shape of the Future, The Australian 20 Dec 08, quoting Richard Woolcott)
3. APEC 19: An Asia Pacific Leaders’ Summit comprising the 19 members of APEC (less Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei) plus India; (source: draft PECC Task Force Report on the Regional Architecture)
4. Asia Pacific 10: A G10 comprising the Asia Pacific members of the G20, i.e., Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, the US and India; (source: draft PECC Task Force Report on the Regional Architecture)
5. East Asia 6: A group comprising the six EAS countries in the G20, i.e., China, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, and India. (Lowy Institute Policy Brief, Oct 2009, A G-20 Caucus for East Asia.)

While these proposals differ one from the other, the following general characteristics may be observed:

1. All proposals (bar the East Asia 6) include the USA and Russia.
2. All proposals would include India.
3. Most proposals (bar the APEC 19 and Asia Pacific 10) exclude all North American countries except for the USA.
4. All proposals (bar the APEC 19) would exclude medium and smaller countries.
5. None of them are ASEAN-centered, as are most existing Asian regional institutions and meetings.

Implications
Looking at the proposals above, we can note general characteristics (3), (4) and (5) to observe that the APc is likely to be less inclusive than the existing multilateral forum in Asia and APEC itself. Unfortunately, this suggests a Directorate of Asia driven by the larger Asian and Pacific powers in collaboration and dialogue with the USA, not a true community of the region – which has many smaller and medium sized nations.

Moreover, we can note from the general characteristic (3) that the APc is not truly a trans-Pacific process. It only includes the USA from the Western side of the Pacific, and not others from North or South America, as APEC does. In this regard, the APc is again non-inclusive, primarily a dialogue between the USA and a selected number of countries from East Asia or the Eastern side of the Pacific (India, Australia and Russia).

Even if the proposal is said to seek to build on existing processes and institutions, the implication that flows from these characteristics is that the APc intends not to be just another grouping alongside those that already exist, but one that, in many ways, is on top of the others – by being comprehensive in mandate yet directed by the more powerful.

How do we think of the APc if it is to be such a directorate? ASEAN think tanks and experts that met in August 2009 concluded that: “The think tanks believe that the idea of an Asia Pacific community, as presently proposed by Australia, may not be sufficiently inclusive. If so, it should not be supported.” (Source: the ASEAN Think Tanks Forum, 4-5 August 2009)

Such a reception is not limited to those who will be marginalised and excluded. Inclusion has a merit of its own, that even more powerful states (which would be included) have learnt to value.  In Asian regionalism, Japan, South Korea, and especially China have strong ties with ASEAN and the Southeast Asian countries, many of which could be excluded in the APc. Indonesia too can be said to have gained from being the largest country and informal leader in the ASEAN group. A non-inclusive membership would therefore shrink the influence and ties that these larger countries would have in the hypothetical APc.

Consequently, an unintended consequence of such an APc could be to confuse other arrangements for Asian states, sans the USA. These include proposals such as Japan PM Hatoyama’s East Asia Community as well as the ASEAN+3 process, which already has ten years of work and been the subject of attention and effort by all involved, including China. This is especially if the APc seeks to be – explicitly or implicitly – the directing framework for all in the region and all other regional groupings in Asia.

In addition to non-inclusion, another general characteristic of different iterations of the APc is that there is no central role for ASEAN. Indeed, in many of the proposals noted above, only one ASEAN member state has entree – Indonesia. Should ASEAN be sidelined?

ASEAN has its achievements and was seen by PM Rudd himself as “an outstanding success story” Rudd indeed saw the challenge as being “How to generalize ASEAN for the larger region? (Source: Rudd, APEC CEO Summit, 15 Nov 2009).

The USA too seems to have come to appreciate the importance of inclusion and of ASEAN. In November 2009, President Obama attended the first US-ASEAN Summit. To hold this Summit, moreover, required that the USA alter its long standing policy against dialogue with Myanmar. At this first Summit, the US and ASEAN leaders agreed to develop a broad agenda for cooperation, ranging from economic cooperation to climate change and human rights issues.

ASEAN is by no means perfect. Nor are ASEAN-centered institutions. Moving away from ASEAN-centric structures however could unhinge the regional balance. A trusted and relatively weak ASEAN has acted as the “glue” that has brought all these regional powers together in Asia, notwithstanding their present and on going differences. The complaint that these ASEAN-centric structures move too slowly is heard in some quarters. But even if justified, it must be considered how much of that is due to ASEAN itself, and how much is due to the underlying interests of other states.

The Path Ahead
The Asia Pacific continues to see the highest growth in the world and, relatively, is weathering the crisis well. The region has high levels of trade and interdependence and protectionism has been reduced. Tensions and differences in the political and security realm have not all been dissolved, but as a whole those have been managed so as to allow a stable foundation for shared prosperity.

The region cannot be complacent. But where conflicts have loomed, ad hoc arrangements have been instituted to coordinate and shape responses. These often draw on and add to the existing bilateral ties and also the multilateral fora. The 6-party talks on the Korean peninsula, for all its frustrations, are often cited as an example of this. Even if the APc idea were to gain support in East Asia, there is no clear evidence that the APc would create a more effective alternative to the current regional architecture and the ad hoc arrangements that have arisen.

It may also seem to the casual observer that the existing regional architecture is a confusing “alphabet soup” of acronyms.  However, these structures did not appear haphazardly but were agreed by governments and have over time developed organically, in response to specific needs and challenges. Through existing structures like APEC, ARF, EAS and ASEAN+3, all countries with a stake in regional peace, stability and economic prosperity are engaged. Through these fora, the relevant issues facing the region (e.g. strategic, political, security-related, economic, financial, and functional cooperation) can, and are being addressed.  It may be accurate to observe that there is no single institution among leaders with the mandate to address comprehensively both economic and strategic challenges.

But this begs the question of whether the diversity and balance of the region can be better served by a single institution or by allowing a web or network of different groupings.  Such an Asia Pacific network can (1) soften questions of who is “in” or “out” of the region; (2) better balance competition for influence and leadership among different powers; (3) complement and be complemented by bilateral strategic and security arrangements that already exist and allow for creative ad hoc arrangements to respond to specific needs; (4) better reflect and draw from the diversity in Asia and the Pacific; and (5) be sufficiently coordinated by governments and leaders at their national levels to meet their own particular emphases and needs.

In what has been done so far, ASEAN has played a significant role. The grouping can continue to do so in future, provided that its own community project proceeds and allows it to credibly and effectively evolve the existing ASEAN-led processes with the full participation of other members.  As Thailand’s Prime Minister and current ASEAN chair, Abhisit Vejjajiva, observed the Asia Pacific should not become complacent with the current arrangement. But for now, the best and most realistic framework for regional stability and institutional efficacy is not to “tidy everything up” into one regional forum, but instead to build upon and develop the institutions that are already functioning and effective (Source: Abhisit Vejajjiva, APEC CEO Summit 2009).

Looking ahead, Asia and the Asia-Pacific have to balance between being a community of values against a ‘community’ based and directed by power. As PM Rudd himself has acknowledged, ASEAN has a role to play in this by promoting an example of a community with its own habits and modes of cooperation. This can be seen in in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which all major powers have signed, and other examples of diplomacy and norms. The ASEAN and Asian engagement across the Pacific and with the USA should reinforce the importance of values and norms and not just the balancing of different emerging powers.

In this, different institutions and processes can play different roles at different points in time. APEC may be even more useful as the USA will host the 2011 APEC Summit. The new ASEAN-US Summit will be another venue, alongside the already established bilateral alliances and summits. If there is need for more, the existing ASEAN-led meetings might possibly evolve.

One such possibility is for the the East Asia Summit (EAS) to include the USA and Russia. This could remake the EAS as a whole or, alternatively, c0uld have an EAS+2 structure. The latter would engage the USA and Russia, while allowing the EAS to meet separately prior to meeting with the USA and Russia. It would also allow the EAS to continue to function fully in the event that for any particular year in which the US or Russian leader might be unable to attend. This is of course only one possible evolution from what already exists (Source: ASEAN Think Tank Forum, August 2008).

Cooperation in East Asia is nascent. The first meeting in over a thousand years between the leaders of Asia’s three regional powers China, Japan, and South Korea took place only some 10 years ago, and this was notably at the sidelines of an ASEAN-led Summit. Since then, amidst growing nationalism and historical animosity that has sometimes led to riots, protests, and diplomatic reproaches, ASEAN has continued to bring all three parties to the table and also brought in others such as India. The needs in Asia and in the Asia Pacific will continue to evolve and groupings and meetings will also need to evolve. But there is, in my view, a strong case against – not for — a non-inclusive fora led by major powers  to direct events in all fields and other fora. The region instead may be better served by a network of multiple and perhaps even confusing and overlapping groups that can recognize and manage the diversity and differences in the region. In this, ASEAN-led processes should evolve to lead the way alongside a network of other groupings and relationships.

JAKARTA POST 15 JUNE 2009

By Jusuf Wanandi

There are many political-security challenges in East Asia, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, transnational crime, climate change, energy security, pandemic diseases, and natural disasters. However, in the last 18 months or so a new political-security challenge has arisen that has overridden everything else, not only in the East Asian region but also globally, namely the financial and economic crisis that started with the sub-prime mortgage problems in the US.

This has been recognized by Admiral Dennis Blair, President Obama’s top national intelligence director. He considered this new threat as one that is global and overriding everything else in the security field, because it could have so many impacts on the world, all the regions, and all countries, developing or developed.

This crisis has definitely been very damaging to developing countries in the East Asian region. The greatest danger to them is to become failing or failed states. Although they are not directly responsible for the outbreak of this financial crisis, but the resulting deepest recession since the 1930s are felt by the whole world and are going to have an impact on their export, developing assistance and capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI). It has increased poverty and unemployment, and could even cause deflation, political instability, and even anarchy, civil strife and regime change if not attended to seriously.

For the more developed nations, new challenges will arise and a tendency towards “beggar thy neighbor” policies, such as protectionism and the withdrawals of their capital from other places will create tensions, dissidence, and possibly frictions and conflicts, although wars are not imminent.

At the beginning of the crisis there was talk about de-coupling between developing East Asian countries and developed countries (the US, EU and Japan). And questions were asked whether China and India could become the new locomotives for the world economy. This was immediately answered in the negative by economist looking more deeply into their economic capabilities, which were still far behind that of the US.

By now, however, it is recognized that the impact of the crisis on East Asia has not been as dramatic across the board as was expected earlier. China will grow around 8 percent in 2009, while India will be around 6 percent, and Indonesia will be at 4 percent. And that is going to help also the other economies in the region, whose outlook has improved and is better than expected.

At the global level there is the G 20 that is becoming the most important forum to find a way out of the crisis and in the medium term to establish new rules and institutions, such as the IMF and the IBRD (World Bank), which can incorporate the rapid changes that have happened over the past two to three decades.

To be successful at the G20, East Asian governments have to come together and cooperate closely to have the necessary impact at the global level. There are five countries from East Asia in the G20, namely China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Australia. The APT (ASEAN plus Three) members have already come together at the Summit level on the sideline of the ASEM Meeting in Beijing in October 2008 and have instructed the ministers and senior officials to take steps towards the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). This is conceived of as an emergency fund whose amount was increased from US$80 billion to $120 billion. The Finance Ministers Meeting in Phuket has endorsed it and in May 2009 in Bali they created the fund.

But for the five East Asian member of the G20, there is the necessity to cooperate closely because next year’s summit will be organized by South Korea. This provides a golden opportunity to influence the G20 for the interest of the region, especially to make sure the G20 will continue and replace the G7/G8, which is no longer relevant for today’s world. To prepare this, the think-tanks in the East Asian region, especially the 5 member countries, should give the necessary support to their governments.

It should be noted that despite the urgency, it has taken the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) a lot of time to implement the idea of the regional fund. Although the idea has been there for some time, and APT leaders had given a go ahead at the ASEM Beijing Summit, it took several months before Finance Ministers finally concluded the deal. This process has been too slow for the initiative to have an effect in overcoming the crisis.

This is why the coordination of the East Asian members of the G20 is becoming more urgent than ever. A better-coordinated East Asia opens the way for informal meetings to be established among them with G20 members on the other side of the Pacific, namely the US, Canada and Mexico. This Asia Pacific caucus will help strengthen trans-Pacific cooperation, similar to the established trans-Atlantic dialogue and cooperation. It is critical that this caucus be formed soon.

***

Jusuf Wanandi is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Vice Chair of the Board of Trustees of CSIS Foundation.

By Simon Tay

CRISES provoke changes. The initiative to bring together the world’s 20 largest economies last November was one change the global economic crisis instigated. The Group of 20 (G-20) summit meeting in September in Pittsburgh was only its third. But the G-20 has already emerged as the key grouping in the global crisis.

Why? How has it performed? What are the possible dangers?

The rapid rise of the G-20 is due largely to the absence of any other effective global organisation. The old G-7 consisting of the established powers no longer sufficed for it did not take into account the rise of China, India and Brazil. The established economies were no longer able to move the world without acting in concert with a number of players which weren’t in their club. Moreover, the largely Euro-American nature of the G-7 seemed too narrow.

The International Monetary Fund, which dealt with previous financial crises, was also overdue for reform. Its handling of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has been questioned, with some accusing it of having made matters worse. Moreover, with the epicentre of the current crisis in the United States and Europe, the IMF was placed on the sidelines.

Asia has undoubtedly gained from the G-20. Only Japan was a member of the G-7. Now China, Indonesia, South Korea and India – as well as Australia and Thailand, as the current Asean chair – are part of the G-20.

But has the grouping been effective? There are real differences between the member states on fiscal and monetary policies. The stimulus packages each introduced differed dramatically in size and scale, reflecting different underlying philosophies. The G-20 has also steered clear of some key but controversial issues like how the US and Europe propose to clean up their respective banks and the long-term role of the US dollar.

Instead, the G-20 has been taken up with other issues, where the interests of its members may not coincide with those of the world as a whole. Climate change, for example, featured in the discussions at Pittsburgh. There is a danger that large, powerful states might come to an agreement among themselves on this issue and then dictate to others.

Another issue the G-20 has taken up has been tax havens. It has issued black and grey lists to identify and pressure the countries it considers to be behaving badly in this area. The US, for example, has pressed Switzerland to release the names of American citizens who have deposited funds with UBS Bank, suspecting these depositors of having illegally avoided paying US tax.

No one should condone tax evasion. But the issue does not seem to have been directly related to the financial crisis that began with American banks.

Another area of divergence between large and smaller countries is that of free trade. Despite G-20 proclamations, many large countries have found ways to limit imports and protect their producers. The most recent example is the US decision to restrict imports of tyres from China. Such actions signal the diminishing belief in globalisation among countries with the largest markets.

Medium- and smaller-sized countries with open economies cannot afford this luxury. In Asia, such countries would include Singapore as well as Malaysia and Thailand. Similar countries elsewhere would include Chile, Holland, New Zealand and the Scandinavian states.

These countries have gained from the global economy. As medium- and smaller-sized countries, they have had to follow international trade rules, rather than make them or break them as more powerful countries can.

Some among them have been able to attend the G-20 but they are not fully within the group. The G-20 is now a permanent institution. Cooperation among the biggest powers is indeed important. But there is no guarantee that large countries will take into account sufficiently the concerns of smaller countries.

Rather than aspire to get into the G-20, medium- and smaller-size countries open to the global economy may be better served by organising among themselves. Working together, they might make their views better known to the G-20 and collectively have a weight that none of them would have separately.

The ‘G’ in G-20 stands simply for ‘group’. But with the largest and most powerful countries on board, it could just as well stand for ‘Giant’ or ‘Gulliver’. The smaller open economies might consider coming together as an ‘L-20′ – ‘L’ standing for Lilliputians.

In Jonathan Swift’s tale, the giant Gulliver could not be constrained by the Lilliputians who tried to tie him down with ropes. He snapped them like threads.

The Lilliputians should not hope to tie down the Gulliver 20. But they can hope to guide the G-20 to decisions that are best for the global system as a whole – and, in the process, prevent the giant states of the G-20 from stepping on them, inadvertently or otherwise.

***

Simon Tay is the Chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and the 2009 Schwartz Fellow at the Asia Society in New York.